Between Market and Non-Market Hours
Introduction
Living arrangements have undergone considerable change in recent decades. In most Western countries marriage is no longer the exclusive context of family formation. In the United States (US) for instance, the number of unmarried couples nearly doubled in the 1990s, from 3.2 million couples in 1990 to 5.5 million couples in 2000 (source: U.S.
Census Bureau). Le Goff (2002) A closer look at the literature reveals, however, growing evidence of the link between marital status and household behavior with respect to many outcomes. Using data from the US consumer expenditure survey, DeLeire and Kalil (2005) find that cohabitingparent families spend a greater amount on alcohol and tobacco, and a smaller amount on education and health care than married-parent families. Cohen (2002) , Mamun (2004) and Stratton (2002) examine the wage differential for married and cohabiting men. Higher wage is observed for married men. McConocha et al. (1993) compare financial decisions between cohabiting, remarried and married couples. More recently, Rangel (2006) uses a sample of married Brazilian couples as a control group to identify the effect of extending alimony rights to cohabitants on adults' time allocation and investments in human capital of children. There is also evidence, based on US cross section data, that married couples exhibit a more 'traditional' division of domestic and market work than cohabitants (South and Spitze 1994, Stratton, 2005 Waite (1995) offers a survey of the effects of marriage and cohabitation on health, mortality, children's well-being, assets and labor. 2 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether the shift from cohabitation to marriage is associated with a significant change in household market and non-market labor supply. More specifically, we use a long German panel data (GSOEP) to test whether the transition from cohabitation to marriage reinforces the degree of specialization among couples. We estimate a model that relates married life to the female-to-male domestic and market work hours log ratios. Other regressors of the log ratios are the female relative earnings, the number of children and the duration of conjugal life. We account for selection bias in the presence of endogenous regressors following the procedure advocated in Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) that we adapt to system GMM estimation.
Our results suggest that marriage increases women's specialization in home-based activities. Important to note, marriage leads to a fall in women's leisure, particularly for couples with pre-school children. The results also exhibit a fall in married men's leisure coming from either a rise in market hours or an increase in domestic hours depending on the estimation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 exposes the theoretical underpinning for the effects of marriage and cohabitation on market and non-market labor supply. Section 3 discusses the empirical specifications. Section 4 exposes the econometric issues. The data are described in Section 5. The results are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical background
The economic motivations which lie behind the existence of the household have been extensively discussed in the literature. At least since Becker (1973) , it has been commonly argued that households exist because they allow household members to concentrate efficiently on activities in which each has a relative advantage. One partner can specialize in non-market, household activities while the other specializes in market work. The distinction between legal marriage and consensual union is not formally stated and "spouses" 3 usually refers to two individuals sharing the same household. However, several arguments exist in the economic literature to predict that cohabitants specialize less than married couples.
First, cohabitants are often seen as playing non-cooperatively (Nordblom, 2004 and references therein). Cohabitations are usually shorter lived than marriages (Brien et al., 2006; Bumpass and Sweet, 1995) and there is consensus to admit that cooperation is more likely to occur in stable couples committed in a long term relationship. Stratton (2005) also puts forward the hypothesis that specialization is closely related to perceived household stability. Using US data, she presents some empirical evidence that the degree of specialization is greater within married couples compared to cohabitants. In contrast to cooperative settings, efficient specialization is less likely for couples playing strategically. He shows that strategic considerations can lead to inefficient outcomes.
Second, consensual unions offer less legal protection than marriage. Married spouses are often obliged to care for each other and spousal maintenance is anticipated after divorce. Cohabitation provides individuals with less risk-sharing opportunities than marriage that may prevent individuals from specializing in home-based activities and household production skills. Cohabitants are thus less likely to specialize in household specific human capital. In this vein, Nordlom (2004) considers a model where married couples have legal restrictions on their relationship that force them to act cooperatively, while cohabitants with limited commitment act non-cooperatively. This makes precautionary savings greater for cohabitants than for married couples. 3 In Germany, the article 6 GG of the Constitution obliges the state to promote the institutions of marriage and the fam- 2 See also Wells and Maher (1998) . 3 Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Anderberg (2003) also study risk sharing between spouses.
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ily through its legislation and to prevent any situation which could disadvantage these institutions (Stintzing, 1999) . One spouse is obliged to support the other before the latter is entitled to subsidies from the state and this support is tax-deductible. This is not the case for cohabitants. In addition, the economic consequences of partnership dissolution are different for married couples and cohabiting couples. The German Constitution does not impose maintenance payments after non-marital separation. However, child support payment is anticipated. In 1994, suggestions to extend the protection of marriage to any form of long-term cohabitation were not passed in Parliament.
Finally, income tax distorts the allocation of time between married and cohabiting couples whenever they are subjected to different income tax schedules. In Germany, married couples can opt for the splitting system. Spouses' income is aggregated and halved, and the tax schedule is applied to this tax base. Married couples thus profit from a more favorable taxation in the case of an asymmetric earnings situation between the spouses (Gustafsson, 1992) . As a result, tax saving is maximized for one earner household, or if partners combine full-time/part-time employment. From a theoretical perspective, Wrede (2003) analyzes among others things, the effect of joint taxation on specialization.
Under the assumption that partners allocate their time efficiently between market and non-market activities through a Nash bargaining process, he shows that family members specialize more in reaction to joint taxation. Most importantly, only married couples can opt for the splitting system in Germany, while cohabitants face individual taxation. To the extent that it implies higher marginal tax rates on first earner and lower marginal tax rates on secondary earner, cohabitants have fewer incentives for specialization.
Empirical Specifications
We consider a household i consisting of a female (f ) and a male (m), that makes decisions about market work, non-market work, marital status and consumption. In this paper, we estimate models with marriage assumed predetermined and models 6 with endogenous marriage. We do not specify a structural model for the interaction between marital status and time use. We only instrument this variable in the market and non-market hours equations.
Also, we ignore the issue of union formation and dissolution. Our estimates may then suffer from selection bias but this problem is general to the labor supply literature. The analysis is usually done conditionally on household formation. We follow the bulk of the literature on this matter. 4 Our results must be interpreted conditionally on couple formation.
Finally, conditioning the analysis on couples with strictly positive labor supplies also raises the problem of selectivity bias. Our estimation method tests and corrects for it.
We now present our base model. To analyze the extent of specialization within households, we specify a two-equation system that relates marriage, relative earnings and a set of preference factors to the female-to-male domestic and market work hours log ratios.
The domestic and market work hours (log) ratios
The base specification is:
where
h m is the female-to-male domestic work hours ratio, r 2 = l f l m the female-tomale market work hours ratio, Y is the household non-labor income, Z is a vector of household characteristics including the constant term, ε is a conformable error term, and α, β, γ and δ are the parameters to be estimated. The subscript i indicates household and t indicates time. This specification was already used in a unitary framework (Kiker and Ng, 1990) as well as in a collective setting (Browning and Gørtz, 2006 ). 5 In the unitary framework, it is assumed that households, irrespective of the number of household members, behave as single decision makers. The collective setting introduced by Chiappori (1988) and 7 Now we turn to the expected signs of the variables included in our empirical specification. As pointed out above, we expect a negative impact of marriage on women's relative hours on paid work (r 2 ) and a positive effect on women's relative hours on unpaid work (r 1 ). The overall effect on female relative leisure is undetermined a priori. Relative earnings ( w f w m ) are expected to be positively related to r 1 and negatively to r 2 . Again, the overall effect on relative leisure is undetermined. Non-labor income has a positive effect on partners' leisure (if leisure is a normal good) but its impact on r 1 and r 2 is ambiguous.
We expect the specialization in home-based activities to increase with the duration of the relationship. To capture this effect we include a series of dummy variables Dur2, Dur3, Dur4 and Dur5 indicating the relationship duration in number of years. 6 Also, the number and age of children are likely to influence the extent of specialization within the family. In line with the effect of children on female labor supply documented in the literature, we expect children to have a positive incidence on r 1 and a negative impact on r 2 . We include the number of children under five and the number of children older than four in our specification.
One might argue that time allocation within the household is sensitive to generational effects. More precisely, younger cohorts may exhibit a more equal division of domestic work and paid labor. To test this hypothesis we include three cohort dummies in our model. Other factors such as nationality, regional disparities and religion may influence the intrafamily allocation of time. The dummy variable German00 is defined as 1 for non-German couples and 0 otherwise, German10 takes on the value 1 for couples with a German male partner and a non-German female partner whereas German01= 1 for couples with a non-German male partner and a German female partner. Our control group is German couples. Included regions of residence are the southern and middle Apps and Rees (1988) 
Alternative formulations
We also focus on the effect of marriage on the level of market and non-market labor supply.
We first consider a two-equation system that relates marital status, the female wage and the female unearned income (household non-labor income together with male labor earnings) to the female non-market and market labor supply. This setting is consistent with the theoretical models that assume the male allocation of time to be rigid. Actually, as exposed in Section 5, German men exhibit little variation in their number of domestic and market hours. 8 This alternative specification is:
where Y f is the female unearned income. Other variables are the same as before. The female wage is expected to have a positive effect on market hours and a negative effect on domestic hours. The female unearned income is expected to reduce women's hours in paid work.
Although men's labor supply is more concentrated than women's, there is some variation in the male allocation of time. We then specify a four-equation model where the male market and non-market labor supply are supposed to be flexible. Formally, we estimate 7 Religious preferences are asked in the GSOEP but contain a lot of missing values. 8 
where the covariates are the same as those of the base specification.
Econometric issues
In this section we discuss econometric issues that arise with our specification and we present our estimation method. We draw heavily upon Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) .
For the sake of simplicity, we consider one equation of interest to be estimated. All results can be easily generalized to a system of equations. A formal derivation is in Appendix A.
We have:
where x it is a 1 × K vector of explanatory variables, β is a K × 1 vector of parameters to be estimated, and ε it is the error term.
First, we control for household-specific fixed effects c i , which captures all unobserved household-specific heterogeneity in the labor supply that remains constant over time. The error term is then expressed as ε it = c i + u it , where u it are the idiosyncratic errors.
We allow for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables. In addition, we allow some elements of x it to be endogenous (that is, correlated with the idiosyncratic error, u it ). Let z it a 1 × L (L ≥ K) vector of instruments which are strictly exogenous conditional on c i . As previously mentioned, we focus our analysis on a sample of couples with strictly positive labor supply. Let s it a binary selection rule that takes on the value 1 if the couple exhibits strictly positive market and non-market labor supply at period t, and 0 otherwise. Whether s it equals 1 or 0, x it and z it are always observed.
Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) -SW hereafter -show that applying the usual fixed effect two-stage least squares (FE-2SLS) estimator to the selected sample yields consistent estimates if s it is completely random -technically s it is independent of (u it , z it , c i ) in all periods-or if s it is a deterministic function of (z i , c i ), where
order to obtain consistent estimates one should carry out a formal test for sample selection and apply a correction method if necessary.
In what follows, we briefly sketch the procedure proposed by SW for linear fixed effects models. 9 The selection indicator s it is generated by means of a latent variable s * it such that:
is the indicator function, a i is an unobserved effect and u it is an error term defined such that u it | z i , e i ∼ N(0, 1), so that s it follows an unobserved effect probit model. To allow a i to be correlated with z i , they specify, following Mundlak (1978) ,
where z i is a vector of individual exogenous variables averaged across periods of time and f i | z i has a zero mean normal distribution. Hence, the selection indicator s it is rewritten as:
Under the previous assumptions, we can write the primary equation (4) as:
where e it is an idiosyncratic error term verifying E(e it | z i , c i , s i ) = 0 by construction.
As noted above, the FE-2SLS yields a consistent estimation of the parameters of interest if the expectation given by (7) is 0. Then, an immediate test for sample selection bias is obtained by testing H 0 : ρ = 0 in (8), which can be estimated by FE-2SLS. For the selected sample (that is, s it = 1) we need only E(v it | z i , s it = 1) which can be obtained from the usual probit estimation:
where λ(.) denotes the inverse Mill's ratio. Let b λ it its consistent estimate. To test for selection one simply has to estimate P (s it = 1 | z i ) = Φ(η +z it δ +ξz i ) with a reduced-form probit at each period t, to plug b λ it into the primary equation, to estimate the augmented primary equation by FE-2SLS and to test for H 0 : ρ = 0 with a simple t-statistic. To add more flexibility to the model, it is possible to interact b λ it with time dummies to allow the coefficient ρ to be different across t. In this case, a Wald statistic is used to test the joint significance of the T coefficients ρ t . In our empirical specification, we use a FE-GMM estimator instead of the FE-2SLS and allow for different ρ t .
SW offer a correction procedure for the sample selection problem when the null is rejected. It amounts to estimating equation (8) by Pooled 2SLS using a decomposition of the household-specific effect c i that follows Mundlak (1978) . Under the previous assumptions about the selection rule and the unobserved effects, the primary equation of interest (4) can be rewritten as:
SW show that applying the Pooled 2SLS estimator to (10), after replacing
by the estimated inverse Mill's ratio b λ it yields a consistent estimator of the parameters.
We adapt to system estimation the procedure presented in SW and propose a more efficient GMM estimator (Pooled GMM hereafter). Its derivation and the computation of the asymptotic variance estimator that accounts for the effect of using estimated rather than actual values for λ it are collected in Appendix A. Now, we address the question of the endogeneity of the regressors and the choice of the instruments. It is likely that hourly earnings and household non-labor income are not independent of hours worked. Therefore, we have chosen to instrument the woman's wage rate, the man's wage rate and the household non-labor income. One might also argue that the effect of marriage on labor supply can not be distinguished from the effect of pre-school children on parental time use. Indeed, the presence of children is more frequent among married couples in comparison with cohabitants who may enter marriage to begin childbearing or to legitimate the birth of a child. Child dependency on their mothers (breastfeeding for example) coupled with the virtual absence of child-care facilities in West
Germany for small children 10 create a strong incentive for specialization in conjunction with motherhood. To limit the extent of this problem, we focus on observations with no children under two. We account for this potential endogenous selection rule in our estimation procedure but assume that older children can be regarded as strictly exogenous after conditioning on the unobserved effect. This approach is commonly used in the literature (for instance Lundberg and Rose, 2002) . Moreover, given that we ignore the issue of union formation and dissolution, we also consider the duration of the relationship to be strictly exogenous once we condition on the unobserved effect. Marital status will be either exogenous or endogenous depending on the estimations.
The set of excluded instruments that do not appear in the labor supply equations consists of the following variables: male and female years of schooling and their squares, male and female age and their squares, product of partners' age and education, and time dummies. Our intuition is that these variables have an impact on the various sources 10 In West Germany full-day child-care is rare (Deutsches Jugendinstitut, 2002 Also, to estimate the labor supply systems (1), (2) and (3) conditional on fixed effects, we need at least two observations for the same couple. Therefore, the data we use for estimating these equations uses all couples without children under two who report, for both partners, a strictly positive amount of domestic work and market work in at least two periods. This leaves us with 12,925 observations from 2,762 households.
Measuring time use
Time spent on non-market work is computed as the sum of hours spent on housework (washing, cooking and cleaning), childcare, gardening and repairs in a typical weekday.
Not all domestic work time is covered by this variable as weekend non-market work is not included. 12 However, we probably account for a larger set of activities than that used when the question is only about time spent on housework in a normal week.
We measure time spent in market work as the annual work hours on all jobs divided by 365 (and by 366 for leap years). It corresponds to an average number of hours worked per day. This way, market work and non-market work have the same unit of time.
Measuring earnings
Total labor earnings include wages and salary from all jobs including overtime and secondary jobs. The wage rate is the average hourly earnings defined by dividing total labor income over annual hours of work on all jobs. Non-labor income includes income from asset flows, rent, private transfers, public transfers, etc. All these income variables are in euros adjusted for inflation with the price index provided by the GSOEP. Non-labor income is in thousands of euros.
Measuring marital status
The couple's marital status is represented with the dummy variable Married that takes on a value of 1 if the partners are legally married at the time of the interview, and 0 if they are cohabiting. 13 
Measuring duration of conjugal life
Duration of conjugal life can be computed from an extra file that contains yearly information on marital status. The data include the beginning and the ending of each marital status spell in years of age. Women who live in a consensual union participate more in the labor market than married women. On average, cohabiting couples are younger, have fewer children and are shorter lived than married couples. These findings could illustrate the transitional status of cohabitation but could also result from the composition of our sample. Cohabitation is indeed increasing over time. 14 The variables related to consensual unions are thus more likely to suffer from right censoring. Table 2 reports statistics on the sample of households with no children under two and with both partners working in the labor market and in the house. The reported sample characteristics are classified by the number of children in the household and by marital status. On average, women work more hours in the house than men but less in the labor market. The variability of hours is lower for men: from the 12, 925 observations, 77 (38) percent are men (women) that work at most three hours in the house per day and 75 (46) percent are men (women) that work between 35 and 45 hours per week in paid jobs.
The domestic workload increases with the number of children. Also, married women work more in the house than cohabiting women and less in the labor market. In all, the female share of "total" work (total work is market work together with domestic work)
is slightly greater than 50 percent for married women and for couples with children. It seems that men do not fully compensate for the fewer hours of domestic work by working 14 15 Hence the domestic work and the market work equations, which exclude the latter variables, are well identified.
Estimates from the sample of couples with no children under two
The estimates of the base model (1) with exogenous marriage and using the fixed effect estimator FE-GMM are shown in Table 3 . To save space, the coefficients of the 21 inverse
Mill's ratios added to test for selection bias are not presented. Instead, we report a Wald statistic that tests their overall significance.
TABLE 3 HERE
At the five percent level, there is statistically significant evidence of selection bias for the log ratio of domestic hours but not for the log ratio of market hours. These results seem contradictory as our selection rule affects mainly couples with women that do not work in the labor market. Consequently, we decide to correct for contemporaneous selection in 15 To save space the 21 probits are not reported. Results are available upon request.
the equation related to domestic work but also in the equation related to market work. 16 For this purpose, we use the Pooled GMM estimator that models the unobserved effect as a linear combination of the time averages of the exogenous variables. In comparison with the preceding estimation, we add eight time-constant regressors to explain the log ratios. Their effect could not be identified with the FE-GMM estimator.
The results are shown in Table 4 report the estimates when marriage is assumed to be exogenous. At the five percent level, the time averages used to model the unobserved effect are jointly significant for both equations. Like the estimates obtained with the FE-GMM estimator, there is only evidence of sample selection for the log ratio of domestic hours. Also, the Sargan's test does not reject the validity of the instruments and the overidentifying restrictions. We now turn to the parameters of main interest.
The results indicate that marriage has a significant effect on both domestic and market work. When women are married, their domestic workload increases relative to men whereas the ratio of female-to-male market hours falls. All else being equal, married women are more likely to specialize in domestic work than cohabiting women.
Relative earnings have a negative effect on the ratio of non-market hours. A one percent rise in relative earnings leads to a 1.034 percent decrease in the ratio of nonmarket hours. Women with a high relative wage are less likely to specialize in domestic activities. On the contrary, relative earnings have a positive impact on the log ratio of market hours. The division of market work between partners is more equal for high female relative wages. Also, non-labor income has a significant and negative impact on the log 16 We also estimate the model that accounts for selection bias only for the female relative domestic workload. The estimates are very similar.
18 ratio of unpaid hours. It could be that wealthy couples buy more market substitutes for home-based activities.
The presence of children in the household, especially of young children, raises women's domestic workload relative to men and decreases their share of market work. This is in accordance with the negative correlation between children and female market labor supply usually observed in empirical studies. Moreover, some regional disparities explain the division of domestic work between men and women. The female relative domestic workload is higher for households living in the southern states of West Germany. The ratio of female-to-male domestic hours is also higher for German born women living with a non-German partner.
We note that the duration of the relationship has a negative impact on the ratio of market hours. Longer durations lead to a fall in the female relative market workload whereas the results exhibit a cohort effect. Younger women are less likely to specialize in unpaid work than their elders.
Testing exclusion restrictions
We now consider whether education, age and unemployment rates (which appear in the selection equation) are valid exclusion restrictions. Including these variables in the log ratios equations does not have significant effects on the original parameters estimates and their coefficients are insignificant. The effect of the duration of conjugal life on the log ratio of market work remains when age is a regressor. The t-values for the coefficients of the female education (age) are below 1.40 (1.33) whereas the t-values for the male education (age) are below 1.17 (1.33). We hence maintain these exclusion restrictions.
We also test for interaction terms between marital status and wages and between marital status and the duration of conjugal life. Whatever the sample used, none of them are significant.
Endogeneity of marriage
Thus far, we have considered that being married or cohabiting can be regarded as exogenous after conditioning on the unobserved effect. However, it can be that time use (market versus non-market activities) and marital status (married versus cohabiting) are interdependent choices. If this is the case, marital status is endogenous. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 report the estimates when married life is instrumented. The duration of the relationship is used as a supplementary excluded instrument. 17 The effects of marriage on the ratios of domestic work hours and market work hours are still significant when it is instrumented. However, the estimated coefficients of marriage exhibit a severe change in magnitude from that observed when this variable is assumed to be exogenous. It is possible that the effects of married life are seriously underestimated when marriage is supposedly exogenous. On the other hand, such large variations in the estimated coefficients of marriage can denote a problem of weak instruments. 18 In such a case, and with no other relevant instruments for marriage, it may be better to just assume its exogeneity. Nevertheless, being married still raises the female relative domestic workload and decreases the female relative market workload, just as before. The effects of the other explanatory variables are in line with those reported when marriage are supposedly to be exogenous.
Does marriage cause this outcome?
If married couples exhibit systematic different characteristics than cohabitants then the observed effects of marriage may only reflect that we are estimating our model on two distinct populations. To check this assumption we estimate the model with a different 17 We test for the endogeneity of the duration of conjugal life whether marital status is assumed to be exogenous or endogenous. In both cases we do not reject the null (that is, the exogeneity of the duration of conjugal life). 18 We estimate the model with other instruments such as the female-to-male age and education ratios.
It does not change the estimates. Also, as mentioned in Browning (1992) , the usual practice of treating dummies as unbounded and continuous in the auxiliary equation may cause problems.
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marital status variable (Change hereafter) that takes on the value one for observations that correspond to married couples previously cohabiting. It is zero for couples that are either cohabiting or always married. This variable is for the permanent effect of the transition from cohabitation to marriage on time use. Interestingly, its effect on domestic and market work hours is significant and very similar to that in Table 4 . The transition from cohabitation to married life, when assumed to be exogenous, increases the log ratio of domestic work hours by 0.150 and decreases the log ratio of market work hours by −0.099 (Table 13 in Appendix B reports the results). We interpret this result as evidence of no selection into marriage.
Robustness checks: Estimates from the samples of couples with no children under five and no children under eleven
As previously mentioned, it could be difficult to disentangle the observed effect of marriage on labor supply from the effect of children. To give more robustness to our results, we re-estimate the model on the sample of couples with no children under five and on the sample of couples with no children under eleven. This leaves us with 11, 727 observations from 2, 579 households if we include all observations with no children under five or with 8, 657 observations from 2, 041 couples if we include all observations with no children under eleven.
TABLE 5 HERE
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 are the estimates with no children under five, and columns (3) and (4) are the estimates with no children under eleven. Marriage is assumed to be exogenous. On the whole, the coefficients of the sample with no children under eleven are less precisely estimated. As for couples with no children under two, the Sargan's tests does not reject the validity of the instruments and the overidentifying restrictions. For couples with no children under eleven, sample selection is not likely to be a problem in the non-market work equation but in the market labor supply equation.
For couples with no children under five, relative earnings still have a significant and negative effect -though smaller in magnitude -on the ratio of non-market hours and a significant and positive impact on the ratio of market hours. The effect of relative earnings is insignificant for couples with no children under eleven. Also, whatever the children's age, non-labor income continues to have a significant and negative impact on the log ratio of domestic hours.
The marital status coefficients exhibit a substantial fall in magnitude when we move from couples with pre-school children to couples with no children under eleven. It suggests that the effect of marriage on the parental allocation of time is higher for couples with young children. It is also possible that the marital status coefficients grasp part of the effect of children on time use as married couples tend to have more children. However this may be, the effect of marriage is significant and has the expected sign. Married life increases women's specialization in home-based activities.
This effect remains when marriage is instrumented; though with a large variation in the point estimates (see Table 6 ). Finally, married life also increases women's specialization in domestic work when we only account for the effect of the transition from cohabitation to marriage. The rise in the log ratio of unpaid work hours is 0.113 and 0.087, and the fall in the log ratio of paid work hours is −0.091 and −0.082, for couples with no children under five and no children under eleven respectively.
TABLE 6 HERE

Alternative formulations: the effects of marriage on domestic work and market work hours
In this section the two alternative specifications of the model are considered. Tables 7 and   9 report the estimates of the alternative model (2) where market work and domestic work are supposed to be rigid for men. Tables 10 and 12 report the estimates of the alternative 19 Marriage is assumed to be exogenous. Detailed results are available upon request. Two supplementary explanatory variables are the female age in the equations related to women and the male age in the equations related to men.
The effects of marriage on women's domestic and market work hours
To save space, only the Pooled GMM estimates are shown. We report estimates for the observations with no children under two, with no children under five and with no children under eleven, respectively. Table 7 reports the results when marriage is assumed to be exogenous. At conventional levels, we do not reject the validity of the instruments and the overidentifying restrictions Marriage has a positive effect on the female number of domestic hours and a negative effect on the female number of market hours. Interestingly, the former effect offsets the latter so that "pure" leisure falls for married women, especially for couples with pre-school children. Finally, Table 9 reports the estimates when married life is instrumented. The point estimates of marriage are very different to those in Table 7 . For couples with no children under two (five), marriage now increases by 7.229 (6.852) the number of hours per day that women spend in home-based activities, which is unreliable. It is very likely that married life suffers from weak instruments. Moreover, none of the wage and non-female income parameters are different from zero. However, the qualitative impact of marriage on female labor supplies remains the same. Pure leisure decreases for married women.
We now turn to the estimates of the second alternative specification. Table 7 . The overall qualitative results remain the same.
In particular, married life increases women's number of domestic hours and decreases their number of market hours such that the total effect is a fall in women's pure leisure. However for couples with no children under five, married life has no significant effect on women's domestic work and its impact on women's market work is significant at the ten percent level only. For men, there is evidence that married life significantly raises their market labor supply at conventional levels for the population of couples with no children under five.
TABLE 11 HERE
Own and cross wage elasticities are shown in Table 11 . Women exhibit a wage elasticity of domestic work slightly lower than that of Table 8 . Their cross wage elasticity of domestic work is significant and positive (for couples with no children under five). Again, domestic work is more elastic than market work for women. On the contrary, men's domestic labor supply is inelastic.
TABLE 12 HERE
Finally, we present in Table 12 the estimates with marriage being instrumented. The validity of the instruments and the overidentifying restrictions are accepted at the one percent level only. Once again, the instrumentation of marriage leads to a huge variation in the point estimates of this variable but the qualitative effect of marriage on women's 25 allocation of time is the same. Married women spend more time on domestic work and fewer hours on market work. Also, it seems that marriage now has a significant and positive effect on male domestic work whereas its impact on male market work is not significant anymore.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated the effects of the transition from cohabitation to marriage on household market and non-market labor supply using a German sample of working couples. Our results indicate that marriage raises women's specialization in domestic work with a greater impact on couples with preschool children. We find that specialization in unpaid work is less likely for women with a high market wage.
These findings are robust across specifications. Actually, marriage increases women's specialization in home-based activities whether we consider the female-to-male domestic and market work hours (log) ratios or women's market and non-market labor supply or men's and women's market and non-market labor supply.
Interestingly, we find that married women enjoy less leisure than cohabiting women.
Marriage decreases women's market work and increases their domestic work so that the overall effect is a fall in their leisure. We also found evidence that married men enjoy less leisure than cohabiting men but the effect of marriage on men's labor supply is less clear cut due to little variation in the male allocation of time.
Finally, the estimated coefficients of marriage change drastically when marital status is assumed to be endogenous but the qualitative results remain the same. Marriage still increases women's specialization in unpaid work. It could also be that marriage influences the decision to participate in the labor market. In this case, the idea is to estimate structural participation equations with marital status as an explanatory variable. This is a topic of future work. Notes: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample means. "AM" refers to couples that are always married, "CM" to couples that transit from consensual union to marriage and "AC" to couples that are always cohabiting. The duration of conjugal life is the maximum duration observed per couple.
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Its average is computed over the 4,762 couples, not over the 28,167 observations. Notes: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses below sample means. "AM" refers to couples that are always married, "CM" to couples that transit from consensual union to marriage and "AC" to couples that are always cohabiting.
28 Table 3 : The effects of married life on the female-to-male domestic and market work hours (log) ratios -FE-GMM estimates 29 Table 4 : The effects of married life on the female-to-male domestic and market work hours (log) ratios -Pooled GMM estimates
Marriage is exogenous Marriage is endogenous 
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Appendix A
Here we derive the GMM estimator and its standard errors for a general model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection bias. We begin with some notation. For couple i at period t we have a joint observation on (Y it , X it ), where
. . . The second-step system has the form:
where b X it is the bloc-diagonal matrix of regressors including the generated inverse Mill's ratios from the first-step probit estimation, θ = (θ The GMM estimator of (11) on the selected sample is then given by:
where C is a bloc-diagonal matrix with C g = N We now turn to the asymptotic variance estimator of b θ. Plugging equation (11) in (12) we can write:
Git an appropriate stack of b Z 0 it to have compatible dimensions. 20 The term ³ X it − b X it´θ in A can be approximated to first order around π = b π, the estimates of the probit equation, by the following expression:
where ∇ π X 0 it is the Jacobian of X 
where r i (π) is a term that depends on the expected hessian and scores of the probit log-likelihood.
Using some algebra it follows that: 
In practice, the unknown term e it , F and r i are replaced with their respective consistent es- where:
is the consistent estimator of minus the expected Hessien (see Semykina and Wooldridge, 2005) . For each couple i, the b r it are stacked to obtain the b r i used in equation (13) . The estimated variance estimator is therefore: 
